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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on two areas of security concern for the European Union: terrorism and 
international crime. I present a model of game-theoretic interaction between a European 
state and a domestic dissident group, who, on occasion, may resort to acts of terrorism. 
Here, identity is crucial to the putative terrorist, providing the microfoundations of 
dissident group behaviour by solving the collective action problem. I also sketch a macro-
model of drugs production in a conflict-ridden developing country, where I argue that 
demand-side policies of regulation may be better than policies that are aimed at eradicating 
supply. As far as the policy implications are concerned, first excessive deterrence against 
potential terrorists may backfire. Secondly, space needs to be created so that Muslim 
migrants are able to merge their personal identities within their adopted European 
homelands. Thirdly, the economic discrimination against Muslims in Europe needs to be 
redressed. Finally, aid to fragile drug producing states should be broad-based and poverty 
reducing, not just benefiting warlords.        
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on two areas of security concern for the 
European Union; terrorism and international crime. Its focus will be on domestic 
terrorism and the international trade in illegal narcotic substances. I have analysed 
transnational terrorism elsewhere, see Addison and Murshed (2005)1, and admittedly 
there are other issues of concern to the European Union, such as refugee influxes from 
fragile states and the illegal movement of people from poor countries.  
 
Why do the activities of certain minority groups, or elements within them, such as 
radicalised Islam amongst mainly youthful 2nd-3rd generation Muslim migrants in 
various European countries, pose such a threat to the collective security of the 
European Union? The answer is extreme acts of terrorism such as the Madrid train 
bombings of March 2004, or the London bombings of July 2005. Besides these acts of 
violence there are other activities, ranging from inflammatory speeches denouncing 
the West and the wearing of the hijab (head scarf), that annoy and disturb the majority 
community in varying degrees throughout Europe. Is this inevitably a result of the 
clash of civilizations, as outlined by Huntington (1996)? Or are Muslim acts of 
violence or defiance a product of their deep sense of historic and present-day 
humiliation, as pointed out by Lindner (2001). These include historical acts such as 
the wholesale expulsion of Muslims who did not convert to Christianity from Spain 
(in the 16th and 17th centuries) and from Sicily (14th century), as well as during the 
20th century in the Middle East, where the British-French Sykes-Picot pact (during the 
First World War) resulted in an extremely unfair disposition of the former Ottoman 
territories. Later the emergence of what many regard as a colonial settler state, Israel, 
and the West’s lack of even handed behaviour towards the protagonists in the Arab-
Israeli conflict spawned deep resentment, as have growing economic disparities; see 
Stewart (2008). Other areas of Muslim disadvantage in the recent past include 
Kashmir in India and Bosnia in the European Balkans. This predicament is often 
blamed on Western double standards towards the plight of Muslims compared to 
others. In this connection it has to be mentioned that terrorist acts, such as suicide 
bombing, may be a rational response if individuals feel a very strong sense of 
solidarity with their collective sense of humiliation and oppression (Wintrobe, 2002).   
 
More recently, Stewart (2008) has documented the systematic disadvantage that 
Muslim groups face in European countries and worldwide. These range from 
economic discrimination in terms of jobs and lower incomes, to the documented 
negative perceptions amongst the majority (white European) population about the 
assumed threats to their European way of life and dangers of terrorism posed by 
Muslim immigrants in their midst. Thus, some of the more extreme forms of terrorism 
and even other non-violent acts, which make a statement of difference with the 
majority community such as the wearing of hijabs, may have as their root cause: both 
the collective sense of injury caused by the sufferings of Muslims globally (such as in 
Palestine, Iraq or Afghanistan), as well as the more palpable economic, political and 
social discrimination felt within the European states that they reside in. The latter 
                                                 
1 There we model the three-way interaction between a domestic rebel group (such as al-Qaida), the 
government they see as oppressive and a Western ally (Saudi Arabia), and a western sponsor of the 
government (the United States and other Western powers). Deterrence against these putative terrorists, 
who are rebels in their domestic country could backfire if their resolve is strong.  
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phenomena can be described as horizontal inequalities that Muslims suffer from in 
contemporary Europe. Horizontal inequality is group-based inequality, rather than the 
inequality in an otherwise culturally or ethnically homogenous society; see Stewart 
(2000) on this.  
 
Explanations of deviant behaviour based on horizontal inequalities stand in sharp 
contrast to culturalist explanations that attempt to rationalise the same pattern of 
behaviour based on the innate nature of Islam, something which is gaining popularity 
in Europe, judging by the rise in populist parties that espouse the single issue of the 
dangers posed by Islam, as in Denmark and the Netherlands. Contemporary racism is 
driven more by cultural identities such as Islam, rather than colour, as in the past. 
Their ability to influence policy rests with their importance as coalition partners, 
which is greater in smaller European states with electoral systems that have full 
proportional representation. In other countries they have greater influence in local 
politics. According to surveys2 , negative perceptions about Muslims among non-
Muslims have grown in Europe: in 2008 52% in Spain, 50% in Germany, 38% in 
France and 23% in the UK felt negative about Muslims. The same survey indicates 
growth in the Muslim sense of identity amongst Muslims immigrants in Europe, 
although there is growing aversion to tactics like suicide bombing amongst Muslims 
in other Muslim countries.          
 
There is a great deal that is said about the ‘hatred’ felt by a section of immigrant 
Muslims towards the Western civilization in countries where they reside. What is less 
well known is the fact that the Islamic religion through its divinely revealed scripture, 
the Quran, actually celebrates racial diversity3 and requires believers to acknowledge 
earlier Abrahamic Prophets as part of their faith4. Some of the sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his cousin and son-in-law Ali, during Islam’s first century (the 7th 
century AD) are testimony towards inclusiveness.5  
                                                 
2 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262  
3 “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye 
may know one another. Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct”. Quran: 
049.013. Another verse says: “And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the 
difference of your languages and colours”. Quran: 030.022. English translations of the Quran from 
Marmaduke Pickthall’s, The Glorious Quran,  
http://www.islam101.com/quran/QTP/index.htm 
4 “Say (O Muhammad): We believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was 
revealed unto Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was vouchsafed 
unto Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, 
and unto Him we have surrendered”. Quran: 003.084 
5 Consider an excerpt from Muhammad’s Last Sermon as in Baihiqi (circa 632 AD): “O people, 
Remember that your Lord is One. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any 
superiority over an Arab; also a black person has no superiority over a white person, nor a white person 
has any superiority over a black person, except by piety and good action. Indeed the best among you is 
the one with the best character….. Listen to me. Did I convey this to you properly? People responded, 
Yes. O messenger of God, The Prophet then said, then each one of you who is there must convey this 
to everyone not present”.  
http://www.themodernreligion.com/prophet/prophet_lastsermon.htm 
Ali, the 4th Islamic Caliph, also the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad in a letter to Malik-e-Ashtar, 
his governor designate to Egypt (circa 656-661 AD): "Remember, Maalik, that amongst your subjects 
there are two kinds of people: those who have the same religion as you have; they are brothers to you, 
and those who have religions other than that of yours, they are human beings like you. Men of either 
category suffer from the same weaknesses and disabilities that human beings are inclined to, they 
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Another strong threat perception in Europe emanates from organised crime. The 
increase in transnational crime, particularly associated with the increased drug trade, 
is widely recognised as part of the negative side of increased globalization.6 It is 
worthwhile noting that the supply of contraband narcotics mainly originates in 
countries that have experienced civil war. The problems associated with drug 
production are similar to the causes of conflict, and involve the interaction of greed 
and grievance within a failing domestic social contract (Murshed, 2002). Poverty 
produces grievance which can lead to drug production, which results in violence and 
even more grievance. Armed political groups use drug revenues to finance their wars; 
alternatively simply to satisfy their greed when the political-economic reasons for war 
have been assuaged (Northern Ireland). Thus, grievance can easily descend into 
banditry. Similarly, drug-barons, whose motives are purely mercenary, use armed 
force to further their political and economic ambitions.7  
 
Poverty is as central to the economics of violence as greed. It produces incentives for 
violent acts, and lowers the costs of fighting. Most drug producing states are low-
income developing countries belonging to the South. Many of the causes of poverty 
are domestic in nature and are associated with bad policy choices as well as 
historically inherited inequities in asset ownership. But there are external factors as 
well. These include the effects of falling commodity prices (coffee, for example), the 
debt crisis and the poverty increasing effects of macro-stabilisation policies (such as 
structural adjustment) imposed by multilateral agencies.  
 
The major drug producing nations are Peru, Bolivia and Colombia for coca; 
Afghanistan, Myanmar and Laos for opium. Many of these countries are characterised 
by civil war as well as widespread poverty. Most of them have also experienced 
growth failure. The consumer of drugs is mainly in the developed North, led by the 
world’s only remaining superpower, the USA. In Colombia, where the USA is 
following a policy of drug eradication at the (farmgate) source of supply, 
accompanied by a policy of military assistance to the government to fight the drug 
trade. Colombia is in the midst of a civil war. In Afghanistan, poppy production (the 
major opium and heroin ingredient) declined, and opium production fell by 90%, 
following the Taliban government’s ban in 2000, see Chossudovsky (2002). 
Following the US led coalition intervention and the installation of the present 
government, there has once again been an upsurge in poppy production, and the price 
of opium in early 2002 was ten times its level in 2000 (Chossudovsky, 2002). 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a model of game-
theoretic interaction between a European state and a domestic dissident group, who, 
on occasion, may resort to acts of terrorism. Here, identity is crucial to the putative 
terrorist; following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), I outline a model where individuals 
                                                                                                                                            
commit sins, indulge in vices either intentionally or foolishly and unintentionally without realizing the 
enormity of their deeds. Let your mercy and compassion come to their rescue and help in the same way 
and to the same extent that you expect Allah to show mercy and forgiveness to you." (Nahjul Balagha) 
http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/letters/letter53.htm#letter53. 
6 According to the UNDCP (1998) estimates, the global production of opium by volume increased by 
141% between 1986-96. In the same period there was a 24% rise in coca leaf output. 
7 It has to be admitted that both rebel groups and drug-barons occasionally provide services to the 
adjoining population. 
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derive utility from their identity, identity based actions and the relative social standing 
of the group that they belong to. This provides the microfoundations of dissident 
group behaviour by solving the collective action problem. In section 3 I sketch a 
macro-model of drugs production, based on Murshed (2005), where I argue that 
demand-side policies of regulation may be better than policies that are aimed at 
eradicating supply. Finally, section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2 TERRORISM  
 
2.1 Government (G): 
 
The utility of the state or the majority group is given by: 
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where:  
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For the government, who let us say represent the majority of the voting public, utility 
is derived from consumption (YG) and security expenditure (A).8 The latter can be 
used in two ways: a component (FG) devoted to suppressing (via policing and 
intelligence surveillance) dissidents, and another element T, which is a transfer to the 
rebel or dissident group, which serves to assuage their grievances. A full and credible 
transfer only takes place in the peaceful or less polarized state; it is otherwise received 
with imperfect credibility (λ < 1) in the state of confrontation. The transfer can mean 
several things: increased (broad-based) public expenditure, greater inclusion in public 
sector jobs, political representation and voice in the decision making process. 
Generally speaking, it is the pecuniary value of including the excluded. Observe that 
there is a trade-off between suppression (stick) and transfers (carrot). 
 
Note that strategies for the government and rebels are in terms of peaceful behaviour, 
so a, e raise the chances of peace, π. C refers to the cost of undertaking a by the state, 
Ca > 0. These costs consist of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements; the first 
because of the cost of distortionary taxation to finance security, the latter because 
accommodating dissidents entails a political cost amongst more hawkish 
constituencies among the majority. The superscripts P and C refer to states which are 
more peaceful and confrontative, respectively.  
 
                                                 
8 It can be argued that (1) represents the preferences of a median voter in referenda based democracies, 
or a similar outcome representing the middle in proportional representation based electoral systems. 
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The parameter µ is similar the contest success functions favoured by conflict theorists; 
see Hirshleifer (1995), for example. Normally, contest success functions in the 
context of civil war are a ratio of military spending by one side relative to total 
military expenditure, weighted by decisiveness or a fighting efficiency parameter. 
Here it has a different interpretation, and represents a set of policies adopted by the 
government side towards certain minority groups, such as ‘radical’ Muslims. A higher 
µ implies a more confrontative majority that is less inclusive towards certain 
minorities, and more resolved to combat their dissidence. In equation (2) GP and GC 
correspond to budget constraints in the two states.  
 
It is instructive to examine the government’s strategic variable. Totally differentiating, 
a, the government’s strategic choice variable: 
 
µ
µ
d
F
TdA
F
T
F
Tda G
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GG
A
22 −

 −=         (3) 
 
All the partial derivatives in (3) are positive. The security budget (A) is part of the 
income of the government, and it can be utilised either to increase transfers to the 
rebels or fight them. Therein lies a trade-off; thus the term in square brackets in (3) is 
ambiguous in sign. The second term on the right-hand side of (3) is negative, because 
a rise in the confrontativeness of the state or majority (µ) causes it to be less 
‘peaceful’. For a certain type of government, the first term is positive; it prefers 
peace.9 I utilise this taxonomy, because there may be different expenditure effects 
following an increase in the security budget depending on the type of government in 
different countries (or even the same government at different time periods).  
 
Given exogenous payoffs in the two states of peace (P) and conflict (C), the 
government will maximise (1) with respect to a: 
 
a
CP
a CGG =− (.)](.)[π         (4) 
 
Essentially, this means that the government equates the marginal utility of its strategic 
action (a) on the left-hand side of (4) to the marginal cost on the right-hand side. 
 
2.2 Rebels or Dissident Minorities(R): 
 
Here we need to distinguish between individual motivation to join a dissident/rebel 
group and the group dynamics that lead to a clash with the state.  
 
As far as individuals are concerned, following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), I 
postulate that individuals directly obtain utility from their identity, and the behaviour 
demanded by that sense of belonging. Thus, a member of a potential minority group 
                                                 
9 Good examples could be given by contrasting the present Spanish and Danish governments. The 
latter’s (or some of its coalition partners) negative attitudes towards Muslims is discernable to the 
discerning; in sharp contrast, after his election following the Madrid train bombings of 2004, the new 
Prime Minister of Spain, Zapatero, called a summit of civilizations (including representation from 
Hamas), as well as instituting an amnesty for illegal immigrants, including Muslim Moroccans who 
turned out to be the perpetrators of the Madrid train bombings.    
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(say, Muslims in Europe) derives utility (Ur) in the following manner (where, 
momentarily, for the sake of analytical tractability I have suppressed consumption: 
 
),,(
),,(
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rrrrr
eeII
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IeeUU
−
−
=
=
         (5) 
 
The individual derives utility from his own actions (er), and from the actions of other 
like-minded individuals belonging to his group (e-r), and above all his own identity or 
self image (Ir), which in turn depends on the actions (er, e-r) just described, as well as 
the inverse of the group’s social standing, θ. In other words, the higher is θ, the lower 
is the group’s social standing.10 In summary, individuals derive utility from actions 
conforming to their groups, similar actions by other individuals who also belong to 
their group, and their own perceived standing in society. Following Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) it is also possible to show that individuals derive disutility from the 
non-conformity of other group members, who do not act or behave in an appropriate 
manner; see also Gates (2002) on rebel recruitment and retention. Secondly, if the 
costs of so-doing are sufficiently low compared to the pain inflicted on errant 
members, individuals of a group will exert effort to bring back members who have 
strayed from group ideal behaviour back to the fold. The important point to note here 
is that the rebel group may use this type of behaviour, denoted in (5) above to solve 
the collective action problem, as described by Olson (1965). Thus, group grievances 
become individual grievances, and individuals act upon their group grievances. This, 
at the extreme, can include terrorist acts.    
 
The rebel group, objective or utility function, R, takes the following form: 
 
),())(1(),( teERReaR CP −⋅−+= ππ       (6) 
 
where: 
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YR denotes rebel group or dissident group consumption, and RP and RC describe their 
budget constraints. The rebel group choice's surround e (effort with regard to peace 
with the state), E describes the cost function for undertaking e, composed of mainly 
psychic costs of ‘capitulation’, with Ee > 0. FR represents direct action against the 
state.11 Here θ denotes the dissidents group’s historical hatreds and the lack of 
contemporary social standing. 
                                                 
10 For example, following Stewart (2008) it can be pointed out that social surveys indicate that Muslims 
are disliked more in the Netherlands, compared to the UK.  
11 Note group behaviour with respect to e has a different to individual, er 
Domestic Terrorism and International Crime  Syed Mansoob Murshed 
 8
 
Differentiating the dissident group’s strategic variable (e) we find: 
 
µθθµθµθ µ dF
Td
F
TdA
F
Tde RRR
A
22 )()(
−−=       (8) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of (8) is positive, e rises with T, but falls with θ 
and µ. In other words, transfers from the state raise peaceful behaviour; a loss in 
social standing, and government militancy, decrease peaceful behaviour by the rebels 
towards the state. 
 
The dissident or rebel group will maximise (6) with respect to e: 
 [ ] eCPe ERR =− (.)(.)π          (9) 
 
2.4 Reaction functions 
 
In order to analyse variations in parameters we first need to obtain a set of reaction 
functions in (a, e) and (D, t) space to capture government-rebel and sponsor-terrorist 
interaction. Equations (4) and (9) form the basis of the reaction functions for the 
government and the rebels, obtained by totally differentiating them with respect to a 
and e. Thus: 
 [ ][ ] 00)()( )()(/ ≤≥≤≥⋅−⋅ ⋅−⋅+= aeCPae
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Note that πae = πea by symmetry. Also even though πa, πe >0, πaa, πee < 0, meaning 
there are diminishing returns to peaceful behaviour. Caa, Eee > 0, RP > RC, GP > GC. 
 
We assume that the two strategies are complements, .0>aeπ  In other words more 
peaceful action or warlike behaviour by one side leads to the same by the other. The 
reaction functions will be positively sloped in Figure 1.  
 
2.5 An increase in government militancy (a rise in µ):  
 
An increase in government militancy (a rise in µ) may result from an increase in the 
vote bank of populist political parties that are more confrontative, or an increase in the 
supply of repetitive hate-creating stories by politicians (Glaeser, 2005) culminating in 
laws banning head scarves, tighter immigration from certain countries and involuntary 
integrationist policies. In Figure 1 the reaction function of the government RG1 shifts 
leftwards to RG2, as there is less incentive to be peaceful (a) for each level of e, see 
equations (1)-(3). A similar line of reasoning applies to the rebels, (see equations (6) 
and (7)), and the rebel reaction functions shift down from RR1 to RR2. The new 
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equilibrium will have shifted from A to point B in Figure 1 with a decline in both a 
and e, peaceful behaviour by both sides to this quarrel, but a greater decline in a 
relative to e.  
 
e
a
Figure 1: Strategic Interaction  Between the
Government and Rebels
R2G
R1
G
R2
R
R1
R
B
A
C
 
 
2.6 A Rise in Rebel Intrinsic Motivation to Fight the State (θ) 
 
A rise in the intrinsic motivation to fight the state by the dissidents can arise because 
of two sets of reasons. One is a loss in domestic social standing. This includes a 
perception of the widening of economic, political and social horizontal inequalities12 
that discriminate against Muslims in European countries as discussed by Stewart 
(2008), or a gradual reaction to laws that discriminate against Muslims (such as head 
scarf bans initiated by the state). The second relates to world events, such as the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the situations in Palestine or 
Kashmir, that add to the collective Muslim stock of grievances. For example, the 
current Israeli military operations in Gaza, and the perceived Western support for this 
incursion, which many regard as a disproportionate reaction to Hamas’ activities, can 
only serve to increase resentment among Muslims.  Either way, the rebel reaction 
function will shift down in Figure 1 indicating less e, and more fighting against the 
state at point C.  
  
 
3 TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
 
                                                 
12 This includes higher job discrimination (unemployment) amongst Muslim youths, widely believed to 
have sparked off the riots in France in 2005.  
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The purpose of this section is to outline aggregate supply behaviour in the South13 
within a macroeconomic context. Imagine an economy that has two broad sectors, 
following Murshed (2005). Output in the criminal sector is an exportable for the 
South, consumed entirely in the North. Total output or aggregate supply in the South 
(YS) can be said to be composed of production in two sectors: legal activities (S) and 
criminal activities (M): 
  
),( MSfYS =   .0,0 21 <> ff       (12) 
The reasoning behind the above is that criminal activities detract from total output as 
there are negative externalities involved; these include complicity in crime (bribery 
and coercion), law enforcement, and the negative spillover effects of foreign 
sponsored destruction of narcotic supply. The first two costs are akin to the directly 
unproductive profit seeking activities (DUP) mentioned in Bhagwati (1982).14  It 
should also be borne in mind that DUP actually reduces total output. A good example 
of the last point is the US government’s DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) sponsoring 
the destruction of coca plantations in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. Although 
compensation is paid, there are bound to be negative effects from some of the 
processes used, such as the aerial spraying of coca crops. The same would be true in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Equation (12) may be rewritten as a function of the two alternative instruments 
utilised to restrict M: 
 
0,0)),(,( 21 ><= MMvtMSfYS "       (13) 
Here t indicates the ad-valorem consumption tax equivalent of a quota in the North, 
and v stands for the tariff or tax equivalent of the quantitative export restraint in the 
South. I will refer to the former as the “tariff” and the latter as the “VER” (voluntary 
export restraint); see Murshed (1992a and 1992b) on their differences. Both the 
“tariff” and the VER are quantitative restrictions. The tariff is like a quota restriction 
on the demand side and the VER a quota type restraint in the supply side. This is 
because we are dealing with a contraband substance, which cannot be directly taxed, 
as it is illegal. But the restrictions will both have their certainty tax equivalents, which 
we utilise in the model in this paper. The crucial difference is that the tariff is a 
demand side restriction where the revenues are retained in the consuming region 
(North); whereas the VER is a supply side control where the monopoly rents 
generated are kept in the producing region (South). Therefore, the tariff has a negative 
impact on domestic value-added in the C sector, whereas the VER does not.  
 
Consider the following mark-up pricing rule describing supply behaviour in the M 
sector15: 
 
)1( xzWPM +=         (14) 
                                                 
13 I employ the term ‘South’ to denote a narcotics supplying country or region in the developing world.  
14 DUP was the original longhand in the lexicon of economics for corruption. It also resonates with our 
present-day pre-occupation with the saliency of institutions in determining growth.  
15 There is a huge amount of value added between the primary commodity (the opium or coca plant’s 
harvest) and the final valued added in terms of heroin or cocaine.  
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where PM indicates the price of the criminal product, z is a labour-output coefficient 
(the inverse of labour productivity), W is the wage rate, and x indicates the profit 
extracted by the warlord or drug baron. Let us say a quantitative restriction is placed 
on the sale of drugs taking the form of a domestic supply restraint (VER). This will 
cause the price of M to rise, and result in positive monopoly rents that are retained 
domestically.16  Note, that I have omitted capital, intermediate input and other costs of 
enforcement from (14), whose inclusion would only complicate the algebra, and 
enforcement costs already enter via the DUP activities captured in (12) above. If we 
assume that labour productivity (z) and wages are (W) are constant, then these rents 
will be captured by warlords: 
 
)1()1( xzWvPM +=+        (15) 
 
Differentiating the above with respect to v, for constant values of z and W, we obtain: 
dv
dxzW
dv
dPMPM =+         (16) 
 
In the case of the tariff, it works on the demand side and the revenues are collected in 
the North. It, therefore, constitutes a leakage from the domestic sector, and the 
differentials in (16) with t instead of v need to be evaluated with a negative sign. 
 
Utilising the information in (13) to (15), one may rewrite (13) as: 
 
0,0),( 21 <>= ffvPtPfY MMS …       (17) 
 
Equation (17) is the short-run aggregate supply function for the economy in the South. 
The two arguments inside the function above represent tariff and VER revenues 
respectively. The former has a positive impact on aggregate supply in the South, as it 
is external, and actually diminishes DUP and other harmful externalities. It works on 
the demand side. Nationals of the South residing in the North could capture some of 
these tariff revenues. These monies could find their way back to the domestic 
economy via money “laundering”. Laundering is a pure asset swap; it does not affect 
the total stock of assets in the economy, but merely converts illegally obtained money 
into an existing legally owned asset. By contrast, a VER is postulated to have negative 
supply-side effects. It is a domestic quantitative restriction, which is a method of 
restricting M from the supply side. It impacts negatively on total output because of the 
negative externalities arising from crop eradication, corruption and law enforcement. 
In principle, however, it does augment domestic demand or expenditure. Some of this 
will be moderated by import leakage. Also, any positive aggregate demand effects 
hinge crucially on income distribution. If warlords, who capture, this rent have a low 
propensity to consume domestic goods then the aggregate demand effects will be 
negligible. It is also worth noting that unlike with a VER, an import tariff on M, 
which is collected in the North, will have little impact on the South’s income 
distribution. 
 
Figure 2: Tariff versus a VER 
                                                 
16 I am assuming that the demand for M (for example addictive drugs) is highly inelastic. 
Domestic Terrorism and International Crime  Syed Mansoob Murshed 
 12
 
PM 
QC 
D1
  
S2 
S1 
D2 
A
B
C
 
 
The analytical differences between a tariff and a VER can be understood by means of 
a demand-supply diagram for narcotics, as in figure 2. The demand and supply 
schedules are labelled D and S respectively, with the quantity of narcotics depicted on 
the horizontal axis, and the price in the vertical axis. We start from an initial 
equilibrium at point A on the diagram. A VER reduces supply, the supply curve shifts 
from S1 to S2. At point B in the figure the world price of narcotics has risen. In the 
supplying region, the South, there is a negative aggregate supply effect and income is 
redistributed towards warlords and drug barons. Equilibrium aggregate output and 
national income may decline in the South.  A tariff or its quota equivalent, however, 
eventually lowers the demand for narcotics.  The demand schedule shifts leftwards to 
D2. At point C, the world price for narcotics (not the domestic tariff-ridden price in 
the North) has gone down. There are no negative aggregate supply-side effects in the 
South, and there are possible increases in national income in both regions. Thus the 
tariff or its quota equivalent may be a superior mode of intervention to control 
narcotics, compared to a VER. 
 
Following the results in Murshed (2005), a tariff-equivalent is the first-best mode of 
control for the socially undesirable M good consumed in the North and produced in 
the South. It has a direct impact on demand. It could also increase income in both 
regions. It has a positive supply side effect in the South and does not have the 
unfavourable income distribution effects of domestic supply controls. The VER is, by 
contrast, a control mechanism working on the supply side of the M sector in the 
South. It creates undesirable rents that go to warlords (who may be helping the USA 
in the war on terror, but not drug eradication), lowers aggregate supply via negative 
externalities as well as DUP, and leads to unfavourable alterations in income 
distribution that further disadvantages the drug producing farm household. It could 
also diminish equilibrium output in both regions. When a supply restraint is 
accompanied by a policy of aid, this could benefit the donor (North) at the expense of 
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the recipient (South), especially if the latter imports a lot from the North, as is the case 
of ‘wasted’ aid on Afghanistan (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). This is likely to be the 
case when the aid that accompanies the destruction of coca or opium crops mainly 
goes to the military and results in imported security expenditure. The crucial 
hypothesis behind the results in the model rest with the nature of the aggregate supply 
effects of the two output restraining instruments, as well as the aggregate demand 
effects of aid. 
 
The observant reader will have realised that the policy superiority of the tariff or tax 
equivalent on consumption will increase if the illegality of drugs in the consuming 
region is removed. But that is the point behind the dominance of a tax over a 
quantitative restriction or prohibition. The former implies forcing consumers to pay 
more for something that they are allowed to use. The latter is a regulation, which 
creates the necessity for evasion, extortion and other shadowy underground activities. 
Revenues from a tax can be better utilised in preventive and rehabilitation 
programmes. In the producing region, legality will help eliminate the wasteful DUP 
type activities that lower total output. It would also make it possible for the state to 
extract some of the monopoly rents associated with production, which can then be 
used for fiscal stabilisation and poverty alleviation.  
 
Even if drugs continue to be illegal, a far superior policy-mix would include the 
taxation equivalent on the demand side of the problem. On the supply side it would be 
better to tackle the causes of increased drug production directly rather than simply 
destroy crops and arm governments. The causes include internal conflict, falling 
commodity prices, and state failure in social provisioning. Aid, which only goes to the 
military and not for broad-based poverty alleviation could ultimately have disastrous 
consequences, as it will intensify existing civil wars. The rise in poverty, as well as 
the poverty-conflict nexus, is perhaps the greatest cause of increased drug production 
at the primary stage. 
 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
I would like to conclude by first arguing that Islamic fundamentalism feeds on the 
West’s historical and present rejection of Islam in its struggle to achieve parity as an 
equally important world religion, as well as the present-day objective, and perceived, 
maltreatment of Muslims and Muslim causes. I do not believe its distaste for the West 
is based on primordial hatred; nor is the primary ‘fundamentalist’ objective the 
obliteration of Western values17; the removal of objective injustices, glaring double-
standards when it comes to the Muslim world, and of course economic progress will 
take the wind out of the sails of fundamentalism. One of the enduring lessons of 
history is that economic development and prosperity modifies culture, religious 
beliefs and practices. 
 
As far as the policy implications are concerned, first excessive deterrence against 
potential terrorists may backfire, a point also made by Frey and Lüchinger (2004). 
                                                 
17 As stated, for example, by the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in an address at Georgetown 
University, Washington D.C, on 26th May 2006.  
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Secondly, space needs to be created so that most Muslim migrants are able to merge 
their personal identities within their adopted European homelands. In other words, 
policies that make it difficult to be both European and Muslim are bound to be self-
defeating, and voice needs to be given to a wider range of Muslims, not just the 
Salman Rushdies and Hirsi Ayan Alis of Europe. Thirdly, the economic 
discrimination, Muslim horizontal inequalities in Europe need addressing. Fourthly, 
demand side regulation of illegal substances needs to be pursued. Finally, aid to 
fragile states needs to be broad-based and poverty reducing, not just benefiting 
warlords and drug barons.        
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